Introduction
There is a dominant feeling amongst reviewers of industrial safety progran1mes and research th.at current methods of analysing and seeking to reduce industrial accidents are meeting with little success. (National Institute of Industrial Psychology, 1972; Ellis, 1975; Jones, 1973) This has lead to a generalised sentiment tl1at ' "radically new theories are needed in accident research" (National Institute of Industrial Psychology, 1972) . A later overview survey broke with tradition when it concluded that:
for maximum effectiveness, safety programmes should concentrate on those practices that can successfully deal with '' 'people" variables (Cohen, 1977, p.177) .
. It did not, however, atten1pt to theorise the nature or ilnportance of such variables. A nun1ber of corn1nentators have indicated that a major gap in industrial accident research methods exists; the lack of close · en1pirical studies of the workplace. It has been suggested that this gap is leading to a poor understanding of the causes of accidents . . (Faverge, 1967) Le Plat (1978, pp. 338-9) states: short, of all the different systems in which the worker is situated in order to usefully define the conditions under which accidents occur. It is to this extent that the study of accidents can be related to the general study of work conditions. From the above 2 sets of observations it could be speculated that: the lack of adequate theoretical conceptualisations of the causes of industrial accidents, the lack of close and systematic analyses of the workplace and the generally observed ineffectiveness of dominant accident prevention techniques, are interlinked. Should this be so, a close empirical workplace study could produce new theoretical insights into the production of accidents and eventually lead to the fonnulation of more effective prevention techniques. But an extensive literature search showed such a study represented a new approach, even within the tradition of the sociology of work. Nichols ( 197 5, p. 217) summarised the "state of the art" as:· A strange situation this . . . that in the overwhelming number of cases, injury and ill-health should not figure in the works of industrial sociologists .
. However Nichols {1975, pp. 221-1) goes on to emphasise the social character of the production of industrial injury, and in so doing provides further confinnation that our speculations are worthwhile pursuing:
injuries at work occur in the context of the social relations of production ... injuries and fatalities take place in a particular mode of production which is characterised by particular social relations; one moreover in which sociologically, if not existentially, neither managers nor men are free agents.
The choice of research methods and sites
Based on the above speculations, and operating within a sociological tradition, we decided to carry out a series of field studies in a dangerous industry. A dangerous industry was chosen for it was here, we thought, that worker consciousness about accident production would be the most clearly developed. We had already worked in and conducted research (Dwyer, 1980) into the construction industry; given our technical expertise, it appeared appropriate to conduct further research in this high accident industry. The decision was n1ade to carry our research of an ethnographic nature on 6 French construction sites.
In this article an account of 1 of the sites researched will be presented. We have chosen to present this particular site for two reasons: (a) a purely pragmatic one; it is a small site hence its dynamics are explicable within the space constraints of the article; {b) it portrays types of work relations rarely discussed in modern organisational literature. Field techniques of semi-structured interviewing, observation or work and the analysis of written documents were employed (these are explained and justified in more depth in Dwyer 1981, pp. 4-6; 1978, pp. 140-9) . Triangulation was used to check the validity of data gathered by 1 method against that gathered by another (Denzin, 1970).
One construction site : an ethnographic study Looking at this site fron1 down below it appears very thin. Very grey also. It is going to be a service tower for an office cotnplex hence it has been designed with no coloured panels, and no windows. A single crane protrudes from its centre. It will be 15 storeys when cotnpleted, it is not a large site, 400n1 2 per floor. Four gangs work on the site, each is composed of 4 n1en. In addition, a general foreman and a site foreman are employed to supervise the work.
As one approach~s the site, the lack of exterior scaffolding pem1its a clear view of some workers. A person wearing a red hehnet, dressed in blue overalls, opening and closing a skip as he pours a concrete wall can be observed ... his manoeuvering is sometimes compli- On the basis of preliminary interviews the response to the ~uesti?n "How do you ~e your job?" produced different replies that indicated. a key d~ensto~ for understandmg the functioning of this particular site. The responses gtven to this question were dependant on neither the ethnic background nor the level of qualification of the workers. Workers responses saw them divided into 2 distinct groups: those dissatisfied with their job and those satisfied with it. Strong antagonism was shown by the dissatisfied workers towards their satisfied counterparts. The dynamics of this tension, its origins within the systems of management employed on the site, and the relationship of these systems to the production of industrial accidents, were clarified through further interviewing. Two of the "dissatisfied" explained their feeling towards the "satisfied" ...
There are 3 or 4 guys here who are good with the bosses; when the bosses say "we'll give you a raise 1 if you work like this" they listen to them. When it was snowing we were the only site in the area that kept working ... because that prick there (they point to the man wearing the red helmet) said he'd work, and we were obliged to follow, otherwise it would have been the street.
The foreman had apparently offered him a bonus to induce him to work.
That guy (he's nicknamed "the motor") takes risks that others won't take ... he's for the bosses 2 he's had accidents because of that, but he'd do anything for a bit more money.
This worker in the red helmet confided:
Sure safety, it's important ... yeah, I've had accidents, recently something fell on my nose, you see (indicating the bump on his nose) ... but it's like that in the construction industry.
He accepted the danger and felt he had a priviliged position on the site. When I asked him about the dangerous manner in which he'd been seen pouring concrete he replied with a drooped jaw, shrugged shoulders and a refusal to speak. Taking up a point 1 of his "satisfied" workmates {A member of the gang I'd seen pouring concrete. This was the "lead gang" and had the role of setting the work pace for the site.) related "There's nothing missing here for safety." I indicated the badly placed planks visible on some work platforms, the holes in the floor, missing safety rails, workplace disorganisation and work pressures ... "That's okay, a fall could happen to anyone ... there'll always be accidents."
These workers, the "satisfied", were detested by the others; they consented to the danger of their task. In order to maintain this consent, they were paid the highest salaries of all workers. To maintain this privileged position, they were offered and accepted, incentives which were paid when they took risks that the others would be reluctant to take. For them, there did not seem to be any "problem of safety" since the'ir own interests in gaining material rewards were directly linked to a lack of safety by the financial incentives offered by · management. Their accidents occurred because they took risks in order to earn incentives. For the employers this translated into a double benefit, safety measures could be economised on, and, a split was obtained amongst the workers. This split was able to be manipulated so as to increase the relative pace of production of the site. The example cited of work proceeding in the snow provides 1 example of this.
The "dissatisfied", who were in different gangs to the "satisfied", showed that they were subject to a different system of management. One crucial difference was that these workers did not receive any incentive payments for the work they perfonned. Before examining this group in depth, let us take a closer look at how work on the site is organised.
Work appeared, from available indications, to be carried out expeditiously. The lack of complicated construction techniques {in comparison with other sites examined) presents itself as a striking feature. This feature reduces the relative levels of skill required for effective task execution. The gangs are organised so as to work independently of one ...
• The " " workers in anotper level of explanation, tbey tlleir work speed, their accidents and near misses as being due to the author· of the site.
·
Qpe of control was able to be maintained du~ to the worken incapacity to defend collectively: as individuals they feel unable to leave tfrlsjob because of the high rate in the industry. "I've had several accidents here, because of the speed by the foreman), all have been small ... but 1, I fell and only just saved my Hfe".
_. it was said at a more general level "There are lots of accidents because the boss ••• that's the problem". functioning of this site is dominated by a mixture of authoritp.rianism (for the and incentive payments (for the "satisfied"). For the foremen this is justi-W: "We've got to go quickly here". They don't deny that the required speed leads to but remain unconcerned about them; after all they themselves never have any. The accidents occurring to the "dissatisfied" workers and the dangers to which they are a.P9JIId appear, on analysis, to be produced, above all, by the authoritarianis•n used to JINIIIIII the site and via which they are "made to work". The "satisfied" workers treat as a part of their task for which they receive higher salaries and incentive payments.
They do not appear to be subject to authoritarian control. Their acceptance of fmancial iacentives, in return for the taking of risks, appears overwhelmingly, as the most important proclucer of their exposure to danger and hence of their accidents.
of the field study
The foreman, at 1 stage during the research, wanted to show me the good side of his lite. He led me to the guard ralls that existed, the holes that had been covered over, the protected aad well-lit stairway. It is true that a certain nwnber of safety measures were in . One must however ask to what extent they would have existed if independent 152 Tom Dwyer workplace inspection did not exist? The foreman was able to detennine in advance when my research was going to take place, and according to 1 worker: "They've organised some protection today, they didn't do it for me, they did it for the inspections. When you've gone, it'll be just like it was yesterday." I reflected on the staircase that appeared to have been recently swept . . . "I built this guard-rail," 1 man said proudly. "When?" I asked.
"This morning, first thing."
In spite of the lack of technical complexity, from an engineering point of view, this research lead me to hypothesise that the social relations existing on the site would be such as to produce a high accident rate. The site statistics showed that during the 3 month construction period there had been 5 lost time accidents, these resulted in 155 lost days for a total of 17 285 hours worked (including foremen). This frequency rate was more than 4 times the national average for the sector (28.9 accidents per 100 000 hours worked), the severity rate was 14.7 5 days (approximately 120 hours) lost for every 1 000 hours worked 3 .
Towards a sociological understanding of the production of industrial accidents
Our ethnographic study has suggested that a range of factors within the workplace can be seen as being responsible for the production of industrial accidents. What appears to be interesting is that the key factors identified as producing accidents, authoritarianism and fmancial incentive systems, are virtually ignored in the dominant literature written for and used in the study of safety mangen1ent (e.g. Heinrich, 1950: Malasky, 1974) . For some writers the theoretical groundings of this literature has more to do with promoting the mobility of certain professions (e.g. Noble, 1977, p. 289 ff.) For others, the grounding is based on little more than attempts to deform science in order to blame worker carelessness for the majority of accidents (See Faverge, 1967, pp. 55-2). In both cases, the theories developed appear to have little to do with the reduction of industrial accidents. Attempts to test hypotheses drawn from these theories are carried out, in the main, in such a manner • as to deny the relevance of social (as opposed to individual) factors in the operation of the workplace and the production of accidents. That literature which seeks to analyse the workplace , and to see industrial accidents as located therein , appears to deal with selected aspects of the problem. Typically , it examines either 1 type of accident (Friedmann, 1964 : Turner, 1967 , or, when based on workplace studies, neglects to examine relationships between observational and interview material and accident record and rate data (e.g. Fitzpatrick, 1980 : Di Naro, n.d: Pilcher, 1972 ). In addition, it is unfortunate that the vast majority of field studies carried out within the sociology of work seem to ignore the systematic treattnent of issues arising out of safety and accidents in the workplace.
A sociological understanding of the production of industrial accidents must perceive of high or low rates in such a way that they are linked neither to the "nature" of an industry , nor of the individuals working therein, nor of the materials it transforms and the work processes en1ployed. It n1ust attempt to ask questions such as the following: What social processes operate that result in a rise in accident rates in 1 industry (firm, plant etc) whilst they fall in another? and then ask: If the social processes identified as contributing to a low accident rate in 1 industry (firm, plant etc.) were to be introduced where accident rates were high, could not an overall reduction in the industry's (firm's, plant's, etc.) rate be achieved?
A sociological 1nodel of the production of industrial accidents must, through its very formulation, atten1pt to locate the answers to the above questions within the transformation of the social relations of work. In atten1pting to lay out such a theoretical n1odel, we must go beyond the narrow confines of the data presented in the French field study, and into an exan1ination of other relations of work treated in the literature. Shannon, 1980 ) By refexdng to the "sudden of work" we have excluded industrial illness from consideration.
~ A characteristic of an industrial capitalist ium is that an importan• part of the surplus gained from t1J.t productive process is invested, once again, in the productive process in order to tranaform ~ conditions and, in the classical model, the division of labdur. AU such finns are the product tlMt aacumulation of capital. (Touraine, 1973, p. 121) We have chosen to treat the industrial fb1n as the unit of analyall Iince it is the dontinant form of organisation within which ..,_.. eccur in the aclvanced wettem uationa such u we have examined in our fieldwork. The ...,_, to be developed is in no way undeuntued by our pointlllg out that some of the social relatlam to be were formed in preindustrial societies, and that anecdotal or written accounts fiOJD tile communist bloc countries produce explanations of accident causation consistent with Conflict occurs at this level when workers and en1ployen contest the distribution of knowledge about the co-ordination of the TSRs.
Modem management literature speaks extensively of the organisation of productive processes and of task co-ordination. The basic assumption contained in this literature Ja that management, as the employer's agents, are responsible for controlling the knowleclge about and the co-ordination of machines, tools, stock, etc. (e.g. Barnard, 1938 : Taylor, 1971 ). Taylor sees "Taylorism" explicitly as a technique to strip workers of the lmowledge and right to question their relationships with their TSRs and to transfer this knowledge to management. For Bravennan ''The more science is incorporated into the labour process, the less the worker understands of the process". (1974, p. 425) The general consequences of the development of Taylorism such aa the increased fraganentation of tasks and the routinisation of work are now well documented, and represent a key feature of the contemporary workplace in industrial capitaHst societies.
Workers are, through the development of the organisational level by employers, gradually transfonned into the mere executants of an unskilled manual task;employers, through their domination at this level gradually control all the knowledge and co-ordination of the TSRs and, on the basis of this control, manage the workplace to their own benefit. The workers end up working either at a monotonous task, at a task for which they do not have adequate knowledge of their relationship with those TSRs external to that task (disorganisation), or they lack the necessary knowledge and skill to successfully transform the TSRs upon which they work (underqualification). In any work situation where the organisational level is dominant, any 1 or all of these factors may affect the. worker. The degree to which these effects are realised depends on the nature and extent of domination at this level.
When pushed to the extremes of its development the command level forms a social relation in which employers have the power to direct workers' actions to such an extent that they act on parts of the work system in a manner that they consciously recognise as being against their own interest.
When this level exercises dominance in the day-to-day functioning of the workplace, the employers benefit due to the workers being unable to oppose the tasks Imposed upon them. The breaking of workgroup cohesion ensures continued employer domination of workers.
Conflict occurs at this level when the workers organise themselves collectively to contest their employer's power and when the employers seek to break worker power and workgroup organisation.
Texts detailing aspects of the history of Great Britain's industrialisation provide accessible in-depth discussion on the functioning of this leve1. 6 IJWMduaBy at 1 of the social levels in order to reinforce the employer's or the worker's pewer at that level. The individual sabotaging an assembly line, the undercover organiser tlf a trade union and the rate-buster in a piecework factory all express different dimenof this level of reality. The saboteur refuses the assembly line u the controller of his/ work speed. The organiser seeks to collectively contest the command power of his/her The rate-buster seeks self enrichment through accepting the employer's defmiof work and refusing the counter-definition made by fellow workers. •' •IJoat. ' dner, 1954), "discipline" and social psychology are tools employed in an effort to reward, command and organise this level, to subject the autonomy remaining to the worker to the logic of social domination. Employers sometimes seek to harness this level of reality in order to break collective worker control at a given level of social reality; the encouragement of the rate-buster in order to break rate-fiXing is just one example. During the recruitment or job-transfer process employers (sometimes with union backing) may seek to "screen out" employees with "individual-member characteristics" considered to be undesirable for a particular job (e.g. colour blindness, slow auto-motor reactions, sensitivity to heat), and in so doing reduce accidents produced by the interaction between certain individual characteristics and the design of certain tasks. The task remains unchanged, but the people are changed.
Power relations
The relative importance of each level in the production of goods and services undertaken in the workplace is detennined socially. Factors internal and external to the workplace limit these detenuinations. Power relations are not "hidden behind" the mode of functioning of each level, the social relations existing at each level are the result of and the expression of power relations as they fonn and refonn in the workplace through repression, consensus and struggle. The dominance of any 1 level is an expression of both conflict within the workplace and the influence of those external factors (e.g. at an abstract level, economy, law, culture, and in the concrete example of our French site, the threat of inspections) that limit the social formation of the workplace. The dominance of 1 level, as opposed to another, is nothing other than the expression of power relations. A change in the relative dominance of a level within the workplace is an expression of a change in power relations.
In applying the model of industrial accidents to the analysis of work, it must be remembered that the categories that have been developed in this article are idealisations. It is rare to fmd a workplace where 1 level of social relations exercises total dominance, equally it is rare to fmd a particular social relation operating in a pure fonn "pushed to the extremes of its development".
Analytically different patterns of social relations may, at different moments and for different workgroups, exist within the same workplace. We can thus conceive of 2 workgroups working at the same process within a factory -1 lacks training while the other, a well trained group, is highly motivated by the offer of piece-rate payments. Their accident rates are similar. A union or a mangement decision to suspend piece-rate payments could, according to the model developed, be expected to result (other things remaining equal) in the lowering of the accident rate for the latter group, whilst not affecting the rate of the fonner.
French site examined, there was no evidence as to the existence of this relation, nor to the existence of disorganisation. This absence appeared, from the fieldwork, to be to a large extent due to the way in which the site had been planned by management.
Disorganisation is discussed as a cause of accidents in much of the mainstream accident prevention literature. Prevention of disorganisation is seen in the concept of "good housekeeping". At a more critical level, Dassa (1976, pp. 406-7) examines and critiques the role played by the designers of work in producing workplace disorganisation and its dangers. Once again, a lack of close empirical studies frustrates our ability to find evidence confinning that a rise or fall in disorganisation is co-related with a rise or fall in accident rates.
The worker can, at the organisational level, be transformed into the mere executant of a manual task for which he/she has the necessary knowledge. This task, however. , lacks variety and is of a repetitive nature. The continued perfonnance of such a task can lead to fatigue, boredom or over-familiarity. Industrial accidents are seen to be a consequence (Caillard, 1976, p. 281 ). This phenomenon was not found on the French site examined. In an effort to reduce the effects of this work, ergonomically designed tools and machines may be introduced by management (or as a response to union or state pressure).. The work of Wisner ( 1972) in France has, with trade union support, been influential in bringing ergonomic perspectives to bear in the redesign of repetitive work. At the individual-member level workers act out that liberty which has not been suppressed or controlled for in the workplace. This can generate accidents when the worker knowingly or unknowingly places himself or workmates in danger as a result of such action. In addition, the individual-member may have certain innate characteristics that are undetected by management's screening practices. In certain cases these characteristics may lead to accidents. A colour blind worker can, for example, cause specific accidents that colour sigh ted workers would not cause . .
A great deal of thinking about industrial accidents has been oriented around diagnoses of individual human characteristics or actions. These are seen as the principal causes of accidents. The prevention methods suggested by such analyses imply that increasing various types of managerial control of the individual-member is the only efficient course to follow. Employers and managers are thus freed from having to consider the role played by the ~ocial relations of work in producing industrial accidents.
On the French site examined, no evidence was produced to demonstrate that the individual-member level was responsible for the production of accidents. It was certainly possible .that a "dissatisfied" worker could act at this level in an atten1pt to discipline the "satisfied" workers. Such action could easily involve the latter being deliberately exposed to considerable danger by a member of the former group.
It is doubtful whether the individual-me1nber level, isolated from the other levels in the workplace (and outside of its "screening for the job'' aspect), plays an important role in producing real industrial accidents. Empirical tests of relevant hypotheses, such as accident proneness, have never established their general validity. (Faverge, 1967 , p. 156: · Crawford, 1974 : Cronin, 1971 .
Conclusion
The sociological model of industrial accidents developed in this paper produces a new, theoretically grounded, atten1pt to firstly conceptualise and secondly categorise the social relations which produce accidents. In so doing, new methods of analysis and the consequent strategies of prevention are opened up for systematic application.
Having conceptualised the causes of accidents in this manner and, in so doing, having made their prevention dependent on changes in social relations, we have departed radically from the politics of dominant perspectives on accident prevention. In so doing, we have hoped to add a new axis to the attempt to find methods by which accident rates can be lowered. Thjs paper represents little n1ore than a small attempt to expose what may one day provide a basis for the "radically new theories . . . needed in accident research".
